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ABSTRACT 
Even the most ardent advocate of neo-classical economics would 
admit that the state has a role to play in the economy, especially in 
the provision of public goods. In reality, many states in the South do 
not have the capacity to perform even the minimal functions that 
neo-liberal economists advocate, much more of a developmental 
state. Many scholars attribute the effective implementation of 
policies to state capacity. However, the concept of state capacity is 
one step ahead. Institutions have to be put up to transform an 
“incapable” state into a “capable” one. The transformation 
experiences of Third World countries vary and, in many of them, 
have been problematic. Some have succeeded while others failed. 
The paper introduces the concept of reformative state which is 
described as the state’s receptivity to and capability to adopt 
change. The success rate of adopting new policies becomes higher 
when the state reaches its reformative status.  
What accounts for the rise of reformative state and under what 
circumstances does receptivity to change occurs? The article 
provides a discourse of the current literature on the reform process. 
The primary aim is to advance a framework for inquiry which will aid 
scholars and policymakers understand what delays or speeds up the 
state’s receptivity to reform. The proposed framework combines 
both the agent and structure approaches and assumes that their 
interaction is dialectic. 
 
Keyword/s: developmental state, state capacity, reform, 
reformative state 
 
 
Introduction 
The neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s following the debt crisis had set 
probably the fiercest challenge to the role of the state in the development 
process. Unfortunately, the two and a half decades of Washington consensus-
based structural adjustment in the South had failed to deliver their intended 
purposes. Instead, the market-based strategy spewed failures in several 
economies in the late-1990s culminating in the East Asian Financial crisis. This 
led to a new wave of renewed interest on the state and its role in cases of 
market failures. Paradoxically, attempts to discredit the state in the pervasive 
state-market debate had produced an unintended wide appreciation for the 
state and institutions and their critical impact to growth. The World Bank 
(2002) admits the importance of political institutions and governance which 
the state can only facilitate. This report stressed the positive association 
between good governance and growth; and that good governance requires 
the ‘power to carry out policies and to develop institutions that may be 
unpopular among some – or even majority – of the population’ (World Bank 
2002:99). But this would not suffice. The government must know what policies 
to adopt, what institutional reforms to undertake, and above all, what 
  
benefits political and economic elites would get from all of these changes. 
Even the most ardent advocate of neo-liberal policy would admit that the 
state has a very critical role to play, at least, in the provision of public goods. 
In reality, many states in the Third World do not have the capacity to perform 
even the most minimal functions that neo-liberal economics prescribe. The role 
of the state was misconstrued because the neo-liberals wrongly assumed that 
the state is an internally cohesive and unitary actor. The state is not generic. 
Many scholars tend to ignore the fact that ‘state structure is not an internally 
coherent, unitary entity, but is composed of several distinguishable dimensions 
like executive leadership, executive-bureaucratic nexus, intra-bureaucratic 
dynamics, and bureaucratic constituents’ (Moon and Prasad 1998:11). 
Understanding the state in this light is helpful in examining why several states 
in the South failed to accomplish even the minimal functions which the neo-
liberals accorded to it. 
This implies that much more is expected of a developmental state. Since 
developmental states require performing various functions beyond the 
provision of public goods, much more institutional capability is needed. 
Previous scholars attribute the success or failure of intervention to the structure 
of the state, the policy instrument available to the government and the state-
society relationship in general (Wade 1990; Evans 2003). From this body of 
literature came the idea of state capacity which was understood to mean 
bureaucratic capacity, insulation, and public-private sector coordination. In 
other words, state capacity is associated with implementation process or 
condition which facilitates efficient coordination between the government and 
the private sector. Institutions for coordination therefore must be put up to 
achieve state capacity. Scholars, however, neglected the fact that setting up 
these institutions in many Third World countries can be intricate and, at worst, 
problematic. Reforming the institutions to achieve state capacity requires the 
high resolve of decision-makers. It is also important that the state must have 
the intent and the motivation to reform. When these criteria are present, the 
state is said to be reformative or receptive to change. Several governments in 
the Third World have failed miserably to effect change because they did not 
have the resolve and the intent to pursue it. Under what circumstances do 
states become reformative? This paper advances an agent-structure 
framework in examining the factors that tend to delay or speed up the 
emergence of reformative state. I argue here that agent and structure 
approaches provide a very useful tool in analyzing economic change. While 
many scholars create a dichotomy between agent and structure, the paper 
assumes that they interact dialectically. Structures can shape or alter the 
conditions or context of decisions which can lead to sudden reversal of agents’ 
policy preferences (Trinidad 2006). The outcome of this reversal is change. 
 
Situating the State in the Reform Process: The Basis of Reformative State 
The statist view implies that the impetus to change comes from within. It sees 
the state as the locus of change, that it is capable of autonomous actions that 
are ‘not simply reflective of the demands and interests of social groups, 
classes or society’ (Skocpol 1985:9). The state, thus, is assumed to be 
  
inherently reformative. But why are states disposed to reform?  Where does 
the motivation or intent to reform come from? Skocpol (1985) notes that the 
reformative behavior of states comes from certain officials who are insulated 
from dominant socioeconomic interests. This could be members of elites, 
military, or political parties whose actions are driven not by personal interests 
but by certain ideology or nationalism. The primary concern of their 
independent action is to address immediate problems, which can be either 
socioeconomic or political, or a combination of both. In order to succeed, this 
reform group must also enjoy organizational strength within the existing state 
structures.  
Trimberger’s study of revolutions is replete with examples of state as agent of 
change. She attributes the social transformation of Japan Meiji era, Turkey’s 
Ataturk Revolution, Egypt’s Nasser Revolution, and Peru’s ‘corporatist’ coup of 
1968 to what she calls ‘Revolution from Above’ (Trimberger 1978). A group 
of autonomous bureaucrats and members of the military in these countries 
seized and reorganized state power, destroyed the existing dominant class, 
and reoriented national economic development. There are two preconditions 
to Trimberger’s ‘Revolution from Above:’ one, ‘a relatively autonomous 
bureaucratic state apparatus; and two, dynamically autonomous bureaucrats.’ 
The autonomy of bureaucratic apparatus, on the other hand, depends on two 
conditions: ‘(1) they are not recruited from the dominant, landed, or 
commercial, or industrial classes; and (2) they do not form close personal and 
economic ties with these classes after their elevation to high 
office’ (Trimberger 1978:4). In order to succeed, ‘post-revolution’ leaders must 
consolidate political power by ‘gaining the cooperation of the most influential 
local interest,’ and ‘use the state apparatus to mobilize resources for economic 
development’ (Trimberger 1978:105-108).  
While Trimberger dealt with extraordinary instances of achieving state 
autonomy, Skocpol (1985:11-13) entertained the idea that it is also possible 
under constitutional polities. She noted for instance the importance of state 
initiatives from the works of Hugh Heclo’s Modern Social Politics in Britain and 
Sweden in which the author highlights that not all state actions were acts of 
coercion or domination but rather the result of intellectual activities of civil 
administrators, and Stephen Krasner’s Defending the National Interest in which 
the concept of bureaucratic autonomy was used in understanding the 
continuity of the U.S. foreign policy during the 20th century. He attributed this 
autonomous state action to certain groups or actors in a ‘special location 
within the otherwise weak, fragmented, and socially permeated U.S. 
government.’   
Trimberger’s and Skocpol’s concept of autonomy is close, if not synonymous, to 
the idea of insulation. Following their lines of arguments, the capacity of the 
state to reform depends on the level of autonomy or insulation of ‘reformists’ 
from outside influence especially from the dominant social class. This suggests 
that reform and autonomy is ‘leader-dependent,’ which is why autonomy can 
be lost overtime. As Skocpol concluded, ‘state autonomy is not a fixed 
structure of any government system.’ Moreover, bureaucratic autonomy is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the state to have the capacity to 
reform. In an insightful article, Chibber (2002) suggests that a crucial 
  
precondition is internal cohesion. To achieve this, the state must be staffed by 
what he calls ‘rule-following bureaucrats’ and that there must be an 
appropriately coordinated state apparatus (Chibber 2002:956). He adds 
that it is important that states must be able to ‘act as corporate entities with 
broadly collective goals, rather than as the sum of the individual strategies of 
their functionaries’ (Chibber 2002:952). Chibber, however, neglects to 
explain what pushes agents in the state to pursue broad goals and why some 
states succeed in putting in place an ‘appropriately coordinated state 
apparatus’ while others fail. What motivates states to develop internal 
cohesion? This important aspect is left untouched in his paper.   
Though necessary, state autonomy alone would not automatically make the 
state receptive to change. Neither would it allow bureaucrats know what 
policies are appropriate and what are not. The choice of policy and context 
of decisions are indispensable factors to the study of reform that statists have 
neglected to consider. Once an autonomous bureaucracy is set up, the course 
of policy that it would pursue is unpredictable. It may end up promoting 
policy of shared growth or otherwise. Why some autonomous states prefer 
one strategy (e.g. intervention) over another is a mystery for state-centered 
theory because of inattention given to the roles of private sectors and civil 
society groups. Even Trimberger (1978:108) recognized the existence of these 
influential sectors, which she called ‘influential local interest’, but did not 
elaborate how they contribute to policy choices.  Apparently, non-state 
organizations play significant roles in determining policy outcomes but to what 
extent or degree they exert successfully on policymaking should be closely 
examined as Evans (1998) did in his embedded autonomy hypothesis. 
Furthermore, it is important that agents must find rents in reform. As to choice 
of policies, Skocpol averred that autonomous states might adopt policy 
initiatives that are either ‘stupid or appropriate’ and that the appropriateness 
of policies which they have successfully produced may have been 
‘accidental’ (Skocpol 1985:15).  
Another fault of the state-as-agent-of-reform perspective is that the 
institutional setting that determines the behavior of agents in the state was not 
given sufficient attention. Autonomous states have institutional basis. For 
instance, a merit-based, non-discriminatory recruitment process is a 
precondition to bureaucratic autonomy. Moreover, well-insulated politicians 
are outcomes of an electoral system or appointment process that can reduce 
transaction costs. Through electoral laws, pecuniary qualification to candidates 
can be avoided or forbid the appointing power to choose from any members 
of his/her family within the fifth degree of consanguinity or affinity. These 
institutions have to be put in place first before a cohesive autonomous state 
could be constituted. But then, agents must find rents in instituting these 
reforms. Local and domestic processes can alter their context of decisions, and 
hence, create new sets of incentives to agents to make them more receptive to 
change. This is based on the assumption that states are part of a larger social 
system or a much bigger global system. 
The conception of a socially embedded state is manifested in Joel Migdal’s 
(1988; 2001) works, which are perhaps the most important references to the 
state-society approach and provide “the most ambitious explanations for the 
  
variation in state capacity across developing countries” (Montinola 1999). For 
Migdal (1988:33), “the capacity of states (or incapacity as the case may be), 
especially the ability to implement social policies and to mobilize the public, 
relates to the structure of society.” For him, to regard the state as an entity 
that claims monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory is too idealistic. He rightfully observes that not all states enjoy 
legitimate use of force. In fact, he notes that states, particularly those from the 
Third World, are in constant struggle for social dominance. States are often 
posited as ‘omnipotent given’ in many social analyses. The role of social 
conflict is more often downplayed or neglected in the study of state behavior 
and if considered, it is always epitomized in the Marxist tradition. Migdal’s 
studies of Israel, Sierra Leone, and Egypt led him to conclude that states are 
in constant struggle for domination against powerful non-state organizations 
in the society. These impenetrable barriers to state dominance are chiefs, 
landlords, bosses, clan leaders, caciques, and the likes. 
The degree of social control of states over these organizations depends on 
various factors. Migdal (2001) points out four sufficient conditions for creating 
a ‘strong state.’ These are: (1) world historical timing, (2) military threat, (3) 
independent bureaucracy, and (4) skillful leadership. These conditions, 
however, vary from one state to another. One of the main causes of variation 
is historical legacy, such as colonial experiences. Colonial policies have 
fragmenting effects on social control, even among highly homogeneous 
societies, by arbitrarily favoring certain group or clan or organization that 
exercises social control. This superficial social control vested to local elites or 
certain groups relies heavily on the backing of their colonial masters. Thus, the 
political vacuum left after independence rendered their social control weak 
and vulnerable to threat posed by non-state and state organizations. The four 
conditions cited above would determine consequently the success or failure of 
the state’s struggle for social dominance. Weak states usually inherited strong 
non-state organizations which the colonialists either consciously or 
unconsciously strengthened or did not help neutralize. With weak foundation 
of social control, they eventually fall into the so-called ‘politics of survival.’ 
State mobilization of the population becomes all the more difficult and the 
dilemma of state leaders acute when strongmen have been able to maintain 
tight grips on local resources.  
This condition, thus, compels weak states to resort to practices and strategies 
for political survival even at the expense of their country’s economic growth. 
The dilemma of state leaders, as Migdal (1988; 2001) saw it, was that they 
do everything to prevent the possible rise of ‘power centers’ from among 
state agencies and non-state organizations which could threaten their political 
status. The paradox is that state leaders also depend on non-state 
organizations as conduits to induce political mobilization in order to 
effectively affect change or implement reforms. The politics of survival, thus, 
forces state leaders to use their appointing power to shuffle ministers of state, 
military commanders, and top bureaucrats to prevent loyalties in potentially 
strong agencies from developing. State leaders resort to non-merit 
appointments to choose the officials with deep personal loyalties as much as 
possible. As Migdal (1988:222) put it, ‘where loyalties to other organizations 
besides the state or nation have run high and where the state’s rules have 
  
confronted heavy opposition, state leaders have taken great care in making 
appointments.’ State leaders also tend to disregard the overlapping of 
bureaucratic functions even though it may be detrimental in implementing 
policies because ‘it does fit into conception of the policies of survival quite 
well’ (Migdal 2001:79). Perhaps the worst strategy that state leaders can 
employ to prevent centrifugal forces from enveloping is the use of ‘dirty tricks’ 
or actions by top-ranking personnel which include imprisonment and 
deportation, strange disappearances, torture, and the use of death squads 
(Migdal 2001:81).  
For Migdal (2001:88), the officials who are in the most difficult situation are 
the policy implementers at the local level who confront a ‘triangular 
relationship with strongmen, on the one hand, and with other state and party 
officials, on the other.’  Migdal avers that the critical role played by local 
implementers on the continuity of state policy either contributes to further 
strengthening or lessening of fragmented social control. Social fragmentation 
is reinforced when local implementers collaborate with local strongmen. The 
best way to break this ‘triangle of accommodation’ is to enhance the powers 
of what Migdal called ‘countervailing forces.’ These forces must be 
permanently ensconced in the region; they must have sanctions to apply that 
can affect the implementers’ career goals; and they must be rather impervious 
to the sanctions that those in the ‘triangle of accommodation’ could apply 
against them. Examples of these are the bishops and parish priests in the 
1970s in Latin America.  
Given the constant struggle of state for social domination, is there hope for 
weak states to regain full social control? Migdal (2001) says that societies 
must be weakened before a new distribution of social control is possible. He 
observed that strong states usually experienced major social disturbances that 
disrupted the social control of non-state organizations. Some common 
disruptions include: combination of war and/or revolution as in the case of 
China, Korea, Vietnam, Russia, and Yugoslavia, and mass migration in the 
case of Taiwan and Israel (Migdal 1988:269-271). Migdal also adds global 
structures as constraints to the actions of state leaders. State officials ‘interact 
with representatives of other states, large corporations, international 
organizations, and an assortment of other transnational actors’ as they 
perform their official duties (Migdal 2001:62-63). Moreover, state actions 
are constrained by sets of international rules or pattern that define the 
systems of trade, investment, finance and so on. Added to these are the 
characteristics of power relations among states that no state leaders can 
ignore. 
Migdal indeed made a magnificent analysis of variation of state capacity 
across developing nations based on social conflict. His theory of human nature 
is obviously based on the Hobbesian perspective where the state is perceived 
as an organization that was established primarily to maintain social order. In 
his theory, Migdal portrays weak states as countries in which mutual suspicion 
exists between state and non-state organizations, like a feudal community 
with strongmen exercising varying degrees of social control. This is not 
surprising for a scholar who spent time studying power relations in states like 
Israel and Egypt for a number of years. Unfortunately, not all developing 
  
nations have the same predicament. But indubitably, social control is an 
essential characteristic of reformative state.  
The state-society perspective as a framework to understanding social and 
economic change is limited. For one, there seems to be an implicit assumption 
that state leaders (whether national or local) and those Migdal considered 
strongmen are two different personalities. In the Philippines and even in other 
Third World countries, the government, especially the national legislature, is 
dominated by elites or what Migdal prefers to call strongmen during most of 
the post-War period. Most of these elites were part of the landed class. 
Hence, social conflict in the Philippines involved peasants and landholders, 
many of whom occupied either national or local public positions. Second, there 
is also an implicit supposition that the state knows what economic policies to 
formulate and implement except that lack of full social control impedes 
implementation. There is a high risk of predation when strongmen (for 
instance, agrarian barons) are the same people who dominate the state. This 
condition casts doubts to the appropriateness of policies they adopt and 
implement. There are occasions where state leaders still pursue unpopular 
policies or actions in spite of resistance from various sectors. The Philippine 
legislature, for instance, ignored for a very long time the enactment of 
comprehensive agrarian reform law during the late-40s and 50s despite 
peasant-related insurrections in the rural areas.  This is a lucid indication that 
state leaders and even non-state organizations have their own policy agenda 
and interests.  Migdal did not rigorously probe this issue. What is clear to him 
is that policies are outcomes of the politics of accommodation transpiring 
among state leaders, implementers, and strongmen.  
Moreover, Migdal’s readers would have an impression that non-state 
organizations are the antagonists because of the challenge they pose to 
state’s social dominance. Is there a possibility of cooperation between them in 
any case? If cooperation was possible, then under what circumstances do non-
state organizations and strongmen cooperate with state leaders? Ironically, 
reforms sometimes originate from non-state organizations in some states. 
When this happens, the government becomes an impediment of change rather 
than its agent. Moreover, weak states are trapped in the politics of survival 
and in the triangle of accommodation. In Migdal’s view, reforms that would 
benefit the general welfare are difficult to sustain, unless there are powerful 
countervailing forces or when abrupt social disturbances take place. This 
makes the pursuit of economic growth a secondary objective of the state 
behind social dominance. It is only after obtaining the latter that it can 
proceed to seek the former. 
Choosing the policies beneficial to the general welfare is a complicated task, 
much more so formulating and adopting them. The inability of social conflict 
based approach to explain major policy change leads us to consider the 
behavioral characteristics of state leaders. State leaders have their own 
reasons for supporting certain policy and for rejecting others. The preferences 
of policy agents, including their stakes in the implementation cannot be 
ignored if one has to understand state policy preference in general. It is 
possible that state leaders do engage in the politics of survival because they 
benefit from the status quo or it is advantageous to their own policy agendas. 
  
This leads us to examine the attributes that motivate policy agents (legislators, 
the president, etc.) to seek reform. 
 
Agents’ Motivation and the Reform Process 
The rational choice model provides an analytical framework for 
understanding the behavior of politicians, bureaucrats, and other policy actors 
in the state. Simply put, it ‘proposes to analyze human behavior on the 
assumption that actors are rational’ (Hindes 1988). From this perspective, 
individuals are perceived to be self-interest seekers, whose actions are 
always directed toward maximizing utility. The insufficiency of conflict 
paradigm, such as that of Migdal’s to explain major policy shift, has led some 
scholars to apply the rational choice approach in their analysis of variation of 
state capacity across developing countries. One of them was Barbara 
Geddes whose study of state capacity in Latin America, particularly Brazil’s, 
contributed another dimension in the current literature. Stressing the rationality 
of behavior of policy agents, Geddes (1994:2) viewed state as a ‘collection 
of self-interested individuals’ and where government policies often reflect the 
interests and economic ideologies of state officials, rather than those of 
domestic or foreign economic elites or powerful organized middle-and 
working-class groups.   
Geddes (1994:14) argued that the ‘capacity to implement state-initiated 
policies depends on the ability to tax, coerce, shape the incentives facing 
private actors, and make effective bureaucratic decisions during the course of 
implementation.’  She added that state capacity depends on the competence 
of bureaucracy to perform these tasks. Needless to say, reform of the 
bureaucracy is necessary to state capacity. But since the pursuit of personal 
interest determines the behavior of political actors, support for bureaucratic 
reform is only possible when doing so would not undermine the bureaucrats’ 
interests or when supporting reform would contribute to the enhancement of 
their careers or economic well-being. Politicians in particular are conscious of 
their reelection while bureaucrats seek career promotion and security of 
tenure. Administrative reform can be costly to politicians because any sort of 
reform tends to diminish, if not deny, the politician access to resources of the 
state, which he needs in order to maintain the support structure of his political 
career.  
Rational choice proposes that agents are engaged in cost-benefit analysis in 
their decision-making. In some cases, politicians use the issue of reform to 
attract the support of constituents even if this would eventually reduce their 
access to resources once the promised reform has been adopted. This is what 
Geddes called the ‘politician’s dilemma.’ In pursuing interests, politicians 
among Third World countries engage in two overlapping prisoner’s games: 
one is between politician and his constituents, and another between him and 
other politicians. Geddes depicts a patron-client type of relationship that 
characterizes these games. Politicians pledge some particularistic benefits to 
their clients like provision of jobs in exchange for their support. If politicians 
were concerned about their re-election bid, why do voters fail to make 
credible threats to punish those who renege on their campaign promises? 
  
Geddes attributes this to ‘information asymmetry’ where citizens generally 
lack the necessary information to judge whether or not politicians are carrying 
out their promises. Moreover, politicians would rather respond to the interest 
of few but politically ‘useful citizens rather than to the general interest of the 
public as a whole’ (Geddes 1994:42).    
Another study affirmed this and concluded that politicians always renege on 
their campaign promises once in power. Montinola’s (1999) study of Philippine 
politics based on rational choice framework offers a principal-agent model in 
which she argues that unless competition to influence policy is largely confined 
to a single dimension, politicians have no incentive or ‘political will’ to adopt 
bureaucratic reform. A single dimension type of competition to influence policy 
occurs when voters’ preferences over one issue can be used as predictors for 
their voting behavior on a majority of issues (Montinola 1999:744-745).  
Will the rational choice approach suffice in explaining reform? It may be true 
that the pursuit of personal interest determines the behavior of state leaders. 
But to argue that politicians’ main concern or interest - that affects their policy 
preference - is solely confined to the enhancement of their political careers is 
simplifying the complexity of human behavior. History is replete with great 
rulers who fought for what they believe was right rather than because of their 
interest to enhance their political careers. It is also tempting to argue that the 
rational choice theorists, particularly Geddes, deliberately exclude in their 
analyses the electoral rules in Latin American where reelection is prohibited. 
Both Geddes and Montinola do not entertain the idea that the inclination of 
state leaders’ and politicians’ behavior to enhance their careers may not be 
an end in itself but rather a means to achieve a concealed end.  
State leaders and bureaucrats need their positions to protect or promote 
certain interests such as the privileges they obtain from their positions in 
relation to their own or their families’ businesses. What comprises these 
interests is based on the type of business in which agents have a stake or 
where they are directly or indirectly affiliated or associated. The problem in 
most economic performance studies is that they focus too much on policy 
outcomes rather than on the process (March and Olsen 1984). That is, poor 
economic performance is often attributed to poor economic policies than poor 
policy process. Many scholars carelessly assume that once the state realizes 
what policies are essential to growth, it can easily formulate, adopt and 
implement them. What determines the policy preferences of agents is either 
ignored or neglected.  
A reformative state must have the ability to introduce appropriate and 
coherent institutional reform. It must have either perceived or actual benefits 
from these reforms. On the other hand, the literature on state capacity is one 
step ahead. Reform is an act of reversing existing policies. It manifests the 
desire of agents to shift from one policy direction to another. It is a response 
from perceived or actual conditions that abruptly affect the interests of 
individuals within the state. Institutional framework particularly the system of 
representation and decision-making procedures determine the extent and the 
kind of reform to be adopted and implemented in the state. In this view, 
politics ultimately makes a difference in the choice of policy. ‘A conception of 
  
politics as decision-making is at least as old as Plato and Aristotle: It is 
reflected in the language and concerns of political thought, from the earliest 
political philosophers through Bentham to Merriam and Lasswell’ (March and 
Olsen 1984:741). Likewise, the study of politics is a study of resource 
allocation. The policy institutions of the state are tasked to allocate these 
resources through policymaking process. Analysis conducted in the neoclassical 
approach focuses more on the quality of the policies adopted rather than on 
the process of how these policies were formulated, hence, neglecting the 
important issue of why some states allocate their resources better than others 
or why they prefer certain kind of policy. This can be gleaned from the policy 
process. The question of who gets what, when, and how out of this process will 
help us understand policy choice. Specifically, the dialectic interaction of 
agents and structure determines the scope and intensity of reform in the state. 
 
The Elites as Agents in the Reform Process 
The direct and indirect role of elites in choosing the policies of the state is 
axiomatic (Putnam 1976:6-8). The elites are highly esteemed in society. 
Economic elites are prominent community members who possess vast tracts of 
land, wealth, high level of education and influence. Elites have inherent 
interest and high stake in governance because they are the most affected 
when the system breaks down. This leads them to have direct or indirect 
involvement in shaping the policies of the state. On the other hand, political 
elites play a key role in economic decision-making by actually influencing 
prices, regulating the degree of competition, formulating the rules of economic 
transactions, and enforcing rules that protect contracts and private property 
rights. In most societies, decision-making power is unequally distributed and is 
more often than not in the hands of few but influential and powerful 
individuals. However, the power to affect decisions is also unequally 
distributed even among elites. Some elites are more powerful or influential in 
the policy process than others. The ultimate authority to decide is vested to the 
so-called ‘proximate decision-makers.’  
Elites as policy agents are, without doubt, rational. Policy decisions are 
outcomes of cost benefit analysis and maximization of utility. But what kind of 
policy do elites promote? I have asserted elsewhere that there is multiplicity 
of interests among elites instead of simply assuming that they foster the well-
being of their own class (Trinidad 2006). Under normal conditions, they would 
not support policies that tend to diminish their power or curtail access to state 
resources. Moreover, they tend to support policies that would give them 
immediate benefits than those that promise long-term profit. There seems to 
be an anomaly in the case of elites in the high-performing East Asian 
economies. The political elites in East Asia promoted the policy of shared 
growth, which the economic elites have supported. Some of these include 
education, land reform, market liberalization, support for small and medium-
size industries and government provision of basic amenities like housing and 
public health services and imposition of self-restraints to prevent abuses. By 
sharing the benefits of growth with non-elites, they were able to win the 
support of their constituents and subsequently acquired complete authority 
and political legitimacy. This has made the adoption of subsequent reforms 
  
politically viable, thus enhancing their reform capabilities. The next issue then 
is what causes the elites to change their policy preferences and what 
determines the kind of reform which the state adopts and implements? The 
recent changes in the global economy, particularly the rapid integration and 
interdependence, have made national economies mutually vulnerable. 
Changes in the international structure can, thus, abruptly affect the basis of 
interests of elites which make them abandon policy preferences in favor of 
new ones. 
 
Global Processes and Institutions as Constraints to Rational Decision-
making 
Generally, the impetus to reform must come from the realization by agents 
that the existing policy is undesirable and obsolete. This is where exogenous 
pressure helps in the reform process. An exogenous factor, like prices in the 
international market, can abruptly reverse old policy preferences. This 
happens when external factors adversely disrupt or change the settings which 
provide incentives or disincentives to agents’ behavior. External environment 
critically motivate or hinder the adoption of reforms. In one study, Woo-
Cummings analyzed the relationship of development and national security in 
South Korea and Taiwan (Woo-Cummings 1998:319-336). Simply put, she 
argued that the national development of these nations was an important 
strategy for national security. Preoccupied by the possibility of external 
attack, their national survival was perceived to be contingent upon economic 
development. The two countries were also ensconced by the Cold War conflict 
that time and were part of the United States’ global strategy. Moreover, just 
as Japan had started its postwar take-off with the occurrence of the Korean 
War, the Vietnam War boosted the economies of Taiwan and South Korea. 
Both of them benefited from American purchases of agricultural and industrial 
commodities, use of military facilities and depots for repair of equipment, use 
as a site for rest and recreation, and contract work for Vietnam (Lewis 1998 
quoted in Woo-Cummings 1998).  
The Philippines, on the other hand, was not threatened directly by any other 
countries during the Cold War. Thus, political leaders and policymakers did 
not have the urgency to attain economic development as fast as the state 
could, in the same manner as Taiwan and South Korea did. The international 
setting rather served as a constraint to policy options not just for the 
Philippines but to other developing countries as well. As noted earlier, policy 
shift in the Philippines was noticeable especially in the 1990s. The country has 
achieved growth that was almost comparable to East Asian neighbors during 
this decade. What motivated Filipino policymakers to support liberal reforms? 
Some answers to this can be gleaned from international conditions at that time 
(Trinidad 2006).                
Stallings identifies three distinct ways in which international factors impinge on 
domestic policy option (Stallings 1992:41-88). The first involves shifts in 
international markets, both goods and capital. International market 
fluctuations determine the availability of external resources, which in turn, set 
limitations to national economic policy. The second is through international 
  
linkage. Policymakers among developing countries have the tendency to 
identify their interests with international actors, whom they have networks or 
links. The extent of linkage determines policy stand. Stallings argues that from 
the standpoint of policy choice, business groups constitute the most important 
networks. Finally, international influence on domestic policy is also possible 
through the use of political or economic leverage. Aid is a typical instrument 
of leverage used by creditor nations to developing countries. An example of 
leverage is the imposition of aid conditionality to developing nations by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB).  
The two decades following the Second World War is replete with stories 
about economic reconstruction of national economies, end of colonialism and 
emergence of new states, and civil strife in many former Third World colonies. 
In the international relations front, the era was the beginning of 
bipolarization. When the Cold War began to unfold, many countries sided 
with either of the two superpowers. There were, however, a number of states 
that remained non-aligned. In the international economic front, the gold 
standard was replaced by an international system based on Bretton-Woods. 
All the other countries’ currencies were set in relation to the United States 
(U.S.) dollar. The 1950s was characterized also by growing resource 
nationalism in the Third World. Meanwhile, Japan experienced high growth 
rates in the 1955-73 periods, eventually influencing other countries, 
particularly those of South Korea and Taiwan, to follow its development 
strategy. While Japan was embarking on an outward-oriented 
industrialization, most developing countries including the Philippines preferred 
to imitate their Latin American counterparts on their import-substituting 
industrialization. The seventies, on the other hand, was highlighted by two oil 
crises, one in 1973 and again in the 1979-80 period, and collapse of the 
Bretton-Woods system in 1973. The floating system of exchange, where the 
value of a country’s currency system is set daily in the foreign exchange 
market, replaced the fixed exchange rate system. The Philippine peso, by 
virtue of an agreement with the United States under the so-called Bell Trade 
Act, was tied to the U.S. dollar.  
Mosley, et al. (1995:4-9) argued that the two oil shocks were responsible for 
deceleration of growth that characterized the rest of the 1980s, with the 
exception of China and some countries in South and Southeast Asia. The 
situation became more unfavorable for the developing countries when creditor 
nations began to raise interest rates on commercial loans. This and the sharp 
decline of low- and middle-income countries’ export prices in international 
market subsequently triggered another crisis – the Debt Crisis – during the 
1980s.       
For most developing countries, the 1980s was a turbulent decade and a 
revelation for policy reforms. The economic crisis that afflicted them and the 
contributory factors that were associated to it were classic lessons to all. As a 
result of the oil price increases in the early-70s, European and American 
commercial banks recycled the “petrodollars” to Third World countries in the 
form of loans. The result was a boom in international lending and dramatic 
flow of commercial bank credits to developing countries during the 1970s. 
Taking advantage of these cheap, accessible loans, they borrowed heavily 
  
from commercial banks to finance their development and infrastructure 
programs. However, after the second oil shock in 1979, creditor countries 
began to tighten their macroeconomic policies, especially monetary policy, 
that raised international rates on commercial loans incurred by developing 
countries during the 1970s. Thus, by early-1980s, there was scarcity of credit 
supplies. The decline of demands for and prices of exports of developing 
countries had aggravated their balance of payment deficits. Based on a 
World Bank (1988) estimate, ‘the combined effect of the terms of trade and 
interest rate shocks was more than 3 percent of the developing countries’ 
average GDP in 1981-86.’  
The crisis call for adjustment strategy to correct short-term imbalances of 
national accounts, usually by controlling demand, led to the introduction of 
structural reforms to restore efficiency in production. As private sources dried 
up, developing nations gradually resorted to International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank for financial support. The latter’s introduction of policy-
based lending has resulted in extensive conditionality imposed upon the 
borrowers and close coordination among major financing agencies that 
produced ‘external pressure on internal economic policies historically 
unprecedented in scope and detail and in the number of countries 
affected’ (Mosley, et al. 1992). 
Almost all foreign debt-ridden countries, in response to the crisis, had adopted 
one or more conventional stabilization packages in the 1980s, mostly under 
IMF’s guidance and financial support. Some countries in Latin America notably 
Argentina, Brazil and Peru had opted for a heterodox approach to the crisis. 
In contrast to the demand management approach, the heterodox approach 
did not hinge primarily on demand restraint to contain hyperinflation and 
stabilization. On the other hand, many developing countries adopted a neo-
orthodox approach that promoted greater reliance on market mechanisms 
and fuller integration into the international economy. Haggard and Kaufmann 
(1992) observed that the developing countries’ responses to the crisis have not 
been uniform but the ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy recommendations of the IMF-
World Bank elicited disparity in economic performance among adjusting 
countries. Those that were able to cope well with the crisis were the ones who 
had made the earliest economic adjustment successfully. The 1990s, on the 
other hand, is associated with the demise of the Soviet Union, acceleration of 
globalization of the world economy, and the Asian financial crisis in 1997.    
Apart from international settings, it is now an established fact that institutions 
can constrain or reinforce the actions of agents (North 1990). Castanheira 
and Esfahani (2003) identify three key functions of institutions that contribute 
to economic performance, namely, effectiveness in representation, 
effectiveness in commitment, and effectiveness in coordination. Of the three, 
effectiveness in commitment is probably the most relevant to policy choice. 
Institutions that maintain effectiveness in commitment comprise ‘any cost that 
policymakers must bear if they decide to reverse an adopted policy.’ This 
means institutions can make the cost of policy reversal expensive, thus 
discouraging policy agents like the president to reverse reform. On the other 
hand, in a society where institutions are ineffective, policy shift can be a 
double-edged sword because it permits both the introduction and the reversal 
  
of reform. 
As described above, the economies of developing countries are vulnerable to 
external shocks. They are necessary impetuses to reformative state. The rise of 
reformative state thus requires political and economic elites who are receptive 
to change and who seek institutional reform to allow, flexibly, other reforms 
to take place. For this to happen, the elites must first realize that their current 
policy preferences are no longer desirable. Structures like global processes 
and development in international economy can alter the elites’ perception of 
what action is rational and what is not. When this occurs, agents are inclined 
to change the rules of the game by aligning it with the new international 
setting (e.g. adoption of liberal policies). It could also lead to elite 
fragmentation as some of them would shift to other more lucrative modes of 
business (e.g. from agricultural to manufacturing and services). This eventually 
creates a diverse group of elites in the state with multiple interests. On the 
contrary, the elites in a non-reformative state are less diverse (e.g. majority of 
which belong to the agricultural sector). The diversity pushes agents to support 
institutional reform in order to make the rules of the game fair to all. The 
economic transformation of developmental states of East Asia and even 
industrial countries came only after they became reformative.   
Table 1: Rise of Reformative State 
 
 When the state becomes reformative, it adopts new rules (e.g. 
recruitment process that is based on merit and ability rather than nepotism) 
that give rise to institutional make up of state capacity such as bureaucratic 
autonomy. This leads to subsequent adoption of other reforms in the economy 
and political system. The prevailing situational attributes, which is altered by 
global processes, will determine the nature of the choices of policies to be 
adopted. It is only when receptivity to reform essentially occurs across most 
groups and agents in the state that a reformative state is born. A general 
consensus to take a new path to development takes place.   
 
Conclusion 
The study of reform process and what delays or speeds up the rise of 
reformative state must take into account both the assumptions of agent and 
structure-based theories to realistically explain the state’s receptivity to 
reform. The role of political elites as rational actors, what determines which 
policies are rational and which are not, the situational attributes that provide 
incentives or disincentives to their actions and the international setting that 
reverses or reinforces the context of decisions of agents must be considered in 
the analysis.  Also, states must be assumed to be embedded in a larger 
global system. This explains their vulnerability to systemic changes in the 
global setting. Most Third World countries are not receptive to change which 
is why they could not make any headway to development. Political elites must 
see some rents in adopting new policies, otherwise reforms are unattractive. 
Rents are usually, but not necessarily limited to material or economic well-
being. They can be equated with the political survival of the elites or the 
  
survival of the nation as illustrated by the experiences of the authoritarian 
regimes of high-performing East Asian economies in the 1960s. The economic 
reforms currently being enforced in the Philippines under the Arroyo 
administration is, in part, a strategy for the President’s political survival after 
several alleged corruption and election cheating were raised against her.  
The recent liberal reforms in some African countries are instigated by a 
mixture of factors. This does not suggest, however, that they have successfully 
developed into reformative states. The construction is underway. One 
prevailing literature why economic development is occurring slowly in several 
African nations is that their traditional societies are not receptive to change. 
Anthorpe (1960 quoted in Doornbos 2000:85) argues that it is in societies 
which are not hierarchically centralized that Western ideas of bureaucracy 
can be more readily adopted. This view holds value and culture as keys to 
understanding social change, but, more important than these is the implications 
of adopting or not adopting reforms on agents. In some countries, political 
and economic elites are faced with either being overthrown or share power 
with new emerging elites (e.g. agrarian barons sharing power with industrial 
elites). As Doornbos (2000:92) concludes,  
In the final analysis, ‘receptivity’ to political change is primarily a 
function of the nature and objectives of political goals and 
strategies, and of popular assessments of their implications, rather 
than of the particular characteristics, cultural or traditional-structural, 
of recipient of ‘target’ groups. 
Moreover, external factors can shape the outcome of cost-benefit analysis of 
agents as regards reform by altering their context of decisions. For instance, 
foreign crisis brought about by European imperialism to pre-modern Japan 
swayed several elites to support the imperial restoration movement. The Meiji 
restoration signaled the rise of a state that was receptive to change. In 
another case, Tshibaka (2003) emphasized the impact of unfavorable world 
economic environment to the export commodities and deterioration of 
domestic terms of trade in Senegal, Niger and Cote d’Ivore. Their 
governments, in response, were compelled to adopt adjustment policies 
prescribed by the IMF-World Bank. Indeed, the rapid integration of the world 
market and the rise of free trade areas (FTAs) have recast the context of 
decisions of agents in different parts of the globe. 
The issue of replicability of the East Asian model or even the success of 
neoclassical model to any Third World countries is contingent upon their 
receptivity to and capacity to engage in reform. But compared to the 
neoclassical view, the developmental state model requires a more aggressive 
and highly interventionist state. This means that much more capability is 
needed so the state could carry out its transformative role. The set of 
incentives and disincentives presently available to nations will determine which 
one will succeed in the long run and which one will remain stagnant for years 
to come.   
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